setpriv - run a program with different Linux privilege settings
Sets or queries various Linux privilege settings that are inherited across
The difference between the commands setpriv and su (or runuser) is that setpriv
does not use open PAM session and does not ask for password. It's simple
non-set-user-ID wrapper around execve
- Clear supplementary groups.
- -d, --dump
- Dump current privilege state. Can be specified more than
once to show extra, mostly useless, information. Incompatible with all
- --groups group...
- Set supplementary groups. The argument is a comma-separated
- Set the inheritable capabilities, ambient capabilities or
the capability bounding set. See capabilities(7). The argument is a
comma-separated list of +cap and -cap entries,
which add or remove an entry respectively. cap can either be a
human-readable name as seen in capabilities(7) without the
cap_ prefix or of the format cap_N, where N is
the internal capability index used by Linux. +all and -all
can be used to add or remove all caps. The set of capabilities starts out
as the current inheritable set for --inh-caps, the current ambient
set for --ambient-caps and the current bounding set for
--bounding-set. If you drop something from the bounding set without
also dropping it from the inheritable set, you are likely to become
confused. Do not do that.
- Preserve supplementary groups. Only useful in conjunction
with --rgid, --egid, or --regid.
- Initialize supplementary groups using initgroups(3).
Only useful in conjunction with --ruid or --reuid.
- List all known capabilities. This option must be specified
- Set the no_new_privs bit. With this bit set,
execve(2) will not grant new privileges. For example, the
set-user-ID and set-group-ID bits as well as file capabilities will be
disabled. (Executing binaries with these bits set will still work, but
they will not gain privileges. Certain LSMs, especially AppArmor, may
result in failures to execute certain programs.) This bit is inherited by
child processes and cannot be unset. See prctl(2) and
Documentation/prctl/no_new_privs.txt in the Linux kernel source.
The no_new_privs bit is supported since Linux 3.5.
- --rgid gid, --egid gid,
- Set the real, effective, or both GIDs. The gid
argument can be given as textual group name.
For safety, you must specify one of --clear-groups, --groups,
or --keep-groups if you set any primary gid.
- --ruid uid, --euid uid,
- Set the real, effective, or both UIDs. The uid
argument can be given as textual login name.
Setting a uid or gid does not change capabilities, although
the exec call at the end might change capabilities. This means that, if
you are root, you probably want to do something like:
setpriv --reuid=1000 --regid=1000 --caps=-all
- Set or clear securebits. The argument is a comma-separated
list. The valid securebits are noroot, noroot_locked,
no_setuid_fixup, no_setuid_fixup_locked, and
keep_caps_locked. keep_caps is cleared by execve(2)
and is therefore not allowed.
- --selinux-label label
- Request a particular SELinux transition (using a transition
on exec, not dyntrans). This will fail and cause setpriv(1) to
abort if SELinux is not in use, and the transition may be ignored or cause
execve(2) to fail at SELinux's whim. (In particular, this is
unlikely to work in conjunction with no_new_privs.) This is similar
- --apparmor-profile profile
- Request a particular AppArmor profile (using a transition
on exec). This will fail and cause setpriv(1) to abort if AppArmor
is not in use, and the transition may be ignored or cause execve(2)
to fail at AppArmor's whim.
- -V, --version
- Display version information and exit.
- -h, --help
- Display help text and exit.
If applying any specified option fails, program
will not be run and
will return with exit code 127.
Be careful with this tool -- it may have unexpected security consequences. For
example, setting no_new_privs and then execing a program that is
SELinux-confined (as this tool would do) may prevent the SELinux restrictions
from taking effect.
command is part of the util-linux package and is available